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Reviewed by Seth Anziska, Department of History, Columbia University 
 
f one were asked to draw a circle around the ‘Middle East’ on a twenty-first century 
map, how far would it extend? Perhaps southwest to Sudan’s capital Khartoum and 
northeast to the Iranian city of Mashhad, skirting the edge of the Black Sea? What if 
the request was to draw a circle around the ‘Near East’—would it reach as far west as 
present-day Bulgaria? And if the question referred to a circle around the ‘Levant,’ on what 
side might the city of Mosul fall? Seventy years ago, would any of these circles look quite 
the same?  
 
Critical geographers and regional experts alike have often designated the diverse 
terminology and array of maps used to describe this region as historical inventions.1 But 
as Osamah Khalil demonstrates in this fascinating article, the boundaries of what is 
known as the ‘Middle East’ have also shifted in line with the changing priorities of two of 
the region’s hegemonic powers since the early twentieth century, Great Britain and the 
United States. Khalil, an historian of U.S. foreign policy and the modern Middle East at 
Syracuse University, argues that the evolving foreign policy interests and overarching 
‘imperial attitudes’ of the great powers justified the divergent geographical constructs of 
the Middle East, reflecting “the movement of hegemony and empire from London to 
Washington” (302). 
1 On shifting geographic definitions, see Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen, The Myth of 
Continents: A Critique of Metageogrpahy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 66-67. For 
treatment of the term by a regional expert, see Rashid Khalidi “The ‘Middle East’ as a Framework of 
Analysis: Re-mapping a Region in the Era of Globalization,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East, 18, no. 2 (1998), 1-8. 
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By tracing the etymology of the term ‘Middle East’ and its alignment with foreign policy 
doctrines and policies over the past century, Khalil links the expanding and contracting 
boundaries of the region with British and American military, political, and economic 
interests. This comprehensive study of various ideological and material definitions of the 
region—justified in turn by scholars, journalists and government officials—is based on 
wide-ranging archival sources in Britain and the U.S., as well as Arabic material 
examining local usage of the term. It offers a compelling explanation of how the Middle 
East emerged as an arena of external contestation rather than a region defined by limited 
geographical considerations or the preferences of its inhabitants.  
 
Khalil foregrounds his argument in relation to Edward Said’s Orientalism, which posited 
the ‘Orient’ as an invention of the ‘Occident’ through a complex power relationship.2 The 
echoes for the Middle East are clear, in that the region was “constructed and reified as a 
site for the exercise of British and American power and hegemony” (303). The author 
suggests four key factors that influenced successive definitions of the region: power 
politics, oil, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and religion (304).  
 
For Great Britain, the strategic demands of resolving the ‘Eastern Question’ in its favor 
took first precedence. European rivalry over the territories of the Ottoman Empire 
precipitated the British invasion and occupation of Egypt in 1882, with control over the 
Suez Canal securing a path to India. The influential American Naval strategist Admiral 
Alfred Thayer Mahan outlined the strategic value of the Persian Gulf for European access 
to the East after a visit to the port city of Aden on the Arabian Peninsula. He was among 
the first to invoke the ‘Middle East’ as a popular phrase, arguing that Britain could 
maintain primacy over its rivals through naval bases and alliances with local rulers in the 
Gulf (306). Press accounts drew on the term ‘Middle East’ as well, situating it alongside 
the larger contest over the ‘Near East’ and ‘Far East’ at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Khalil describes how one British foreign correspondent, Valentine Chirol, adopted 
Mahan’s term as a means of asserting Britain’s strategic ascendency in Asia, incorporating 
western and northern land and sea approaches to India as part of an expanded Middle 
East (306-307). 
 
Against the backdrop of great power politics, the religious revival spearheaded by 
European and American missionaries increased pilgrimages and expeditions to the 
region, solidifying Anglo-American interest in the Holy Land. The signing of the sixty 
year D’Arcy Oil Concession in 1901 and the British navy’s subsequent decision to move 
from coal to oil indelibly marked the region as a prized strategic arena in its own right, 
well beyond its role as a transit point to other parts of the British Empire. Khalil examines 
contemporaneous World War I accounts that cycled between various definitions of the 
eastern territories as ‘Near,’ ‘Middle,’ and ‘Far,’ and draws on records from the Public 
2 Edward Said, Orientalism, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage, 1994).  
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Records Office to explore the crucial diplomatic reorganization that culminated in the 
1921 Cairo Conference (311). This gathering of High Commissioners and Residents 
established a unified British policy in the Middle East under the direction of the new 
Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill. Churchill’s Middle East Department, which had 
wrested regional control away from Lord Curzon and the India Office, implemented 
policies that intensified British dominance across the region, resulting in Emir Faisal bin 
Hussein’s installation as King of Iraq and the establishment of Transjordan under Emir 
Abdullah bin Hussein. 
 
After the outbreak of World War II, and the ascendency of U.S. power across the globe, 
American foreign policy drew on evolving British definitions of the Middle East. Khalil 
cites coverage of the area by the Office of Strategic Service (OSS), the American wartime 
intelligence service, to demonstrate a range of definitions that extended from Egypt to 
Afghanistan. He explores the region’s transition from British to American influence 
during the 1947 Pentagon Talks, as the U.S. government established foreign policy 
priorities in what was called the “Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East” (314). The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff later distinguished between the two, with the “Eastern 
Mediterranean” covering Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Egypt, leaving Iraq, Iran, 
and the Arabian Peninsula to the “Middle East” (314). Over time, the term ‘Middle East’ 
took precedence, and Turkey became the region’s front line against the Soviet Union as 
part of the emergent Truman Doctrine. Khalil cites Secretary of Defense James Forrestal’s 
view of Turkey as a “natural barrier to an advance by Russia to the Eastern Mediterranean 
and Middle East countries, Palestine in particular” (315). Combined with the import of 
cheap oil via the Suez Canal as part of the containment goals of the Marshall Plan, the 
region was now firmly a subset of Cold War imperatives. 
 
The continuing redefinition of bureaucratic terminology to encompass the region within 
the State Department is well covered by Khalil, who traces public discourse around the 
varied definitions. This mirrors his approach to attitudes in Great Britain earlier in the 
century, highlighting the continuities that inhered in the transition from British to 
American hegemony. But a predominant focus on these two great powers also obscures 
the role of other regional hegemons, such as the Soviet Union. In Khalil’s account, the 
Soviets largely appear as a subset of a burgeoning Cold War rivalry. From the viewpoint of 
Moscow, how might the region have been constructed differently?3 And while assigning 
hegemonic status to Britain and the United States certainly makes historical sense (and 
fits the purview of the article), the push and pull of other forces in the region during the 
twentieth century—from France to Germany and Italy—influenced strategic conceptions 
of the Middle East as well.  
 
3 One relevant account in this regard is Yevgeny Primakov, Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes 
in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present (New York Basic Books, 2009). 
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Khalil also explores the emergence of American scholarly institutions and think tanks 
devoted to the region, which further served to bolster use of the term ‘Middle East’ while 
also signaling its flexibility. “Indeed,” as Khalil writes, “the malleability of the term and 
the region it represented would be an asset to U.S. strategic planners during the Cold 
War” (319). With the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), both 
Britain and the United States sought to establish a security arrangement for the region in 
the form of the Middle East Command (MEC). Israel’s creation in 1948 complicated 
matters, leading to the Eisenhower Administration’s pursuit of the ‘Northern Tier’ 
alliance comprised of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Utilizing records from the State 
Department’s Office of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), Khalil demonstrates how Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles “redefined the borders of the ‘Middle East’ yet again” (321). With 
Western antagonism towards Egypt growing under the rule of President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, the 1956 Suez Crisis formally curtailed British influence in the Middle East. As the 
United States and the Soviet Union forced an end to the tripartite aggression of Israel, 
Britain and France, the Eisenhower Doctrine underscored resurgent American aims in the 
region. Drawing on the NEA records, Khalil shows how Afghanistan, Morocco, Greece, 
and Tunisia were at one point tacked on to the ‘Middle East’ for strategic reasons as well.  
 
To counter claims that the region was never assigned a name in internal sources, Khalil 
looks at the phraseology of Arab geographers to highlight alternative perspectives. Using 
material from the American University in Cairo Archives, including the Egyptian 
magazine al-Hilāl, he highlights the dissonance between external and internal usage, as 
well as the differences between scholarly and security-oriented discussions of the region. 
Arab scholars and journalists continued to contest the evolving usage of the term ‘Middle 
East’ throughout the late twentieth century, and Khalil situates the debates over 
terminology against the backdrop of rising American power on the ground. His 
discussion of modernization theory links the projection of U.S. power with ideological 
assumptions about Middle Eastern society, a ‘Third World’ locale in need of external 
assistance. Drawing on the work of Nils Gilman as well as Zachary Lockman, Khalil 
explains how modernization theory drew on essentializing definitions of Middle 
Easterners that traded racial hierarchies for cultural ones by the 1960s.4 
 
Alongside the growing importance of oil, as the pioneering work of Robert Vitalis on the 
Saudi oil giant ARAMCO has demonstrated for the immediate postwar period, U.S. 
interests in the Middle East took on a very troubling cast by the 1970s.5 Khalil argues that 
the 1967 and 1973 regional wars reshaped definitions of the region once again, fomenting 
the growth of the U.S.-Israel alliance and the American dependence on conservative 
regimes like Iran and Saudi Arabia (331). He draws on a wide range of secondary literature 
4 See Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007) and Zachary Lockman, Contending Visions of the Middle East: The 
History and Politics of Orientalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).   
5 Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (London: Verso, 2009). 
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to outline the passage from President Richard Nixon’s “Twin Pillars” to the birth of the US 
Central Command (CENTCOM) under President Jimmy Carter and the articulation of a 
space known as the “Greater Middle East” in the early 1990s (333). Khalil suggests that this 
new area, ranging from Morocco to India and including countries in central East Africa 
and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, signaled a utilitarian approach that 
wielded geographic representation for strategic ends.  
 
Such an approach reached its apogee after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, as 
scholars tried to situate events in wider historical context, relying on “contrived or 
overstated geographic, historical and social ties to validate their theories” (335). Khalil 
criticizes historians like Douglas Little on the left and Michael Oren on the right for 
conflating the ‘Middle East’ with the threat of radical political Islam on the one hand, and 
U.S. support for Zionism and the creation of Israel on the other (335-336).6  
 
In this regard, Khalil’s account raises the question of periodization, and the role of the 
late 1970s and 1980s in forging post-Cold War conceptions of the region. As Hamit 
Bozarslan has suggested in focusing on 1979, and Mahmood Mamdani in terms of the rise 
of political Islam, these intervening decades were crucial for the elaboration of particular 
foreign policy ideas about the region.7 Many of the American policymakers who 
articulated a new approach to the Middle East by the early 2000s were in fact drawing on 
concepts that first circulated among neoconservative critics of the Carter administration 
decades earlier. Coupled with the region’s ideological transformations, such as the 
religious revival in Egypt and the Iranian Revolution, as well as local violence fomented 
by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the Iran-Iraq War, Middle Easterners 
themselves were developing radically new conceptions of external and regional powers by 
the end of the Cold War. 
 
As Khalil’s article underscores, the Middle East was constantly subject to the vested 
interests and strategic concerns of external powers. By unraveling successive assignations 
of the ‘Middle East,’ the author situates the region as a mirror to British and later 
American perceptions of their expanding global reach and evolving national security 
concerns. In its geographic malleability, expanding and contracting at the whim of ruling 
hegemons, the term ‘Middle East’ becomes a tool of control.8 In its eclipse of ‘Near East’ 
6 See Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002) and Michael Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: 
America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present (New York: Norton, 2008). 
7 See Hamit Bozarslan, “Revisiting the Middle East’s 1979,” Economy and Society (2012) 41:4, 558-
567; and Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror 
(New York: Pantheon, 2004). 
8 Here it might be useful to think in parallel with Anders Stephanson, whose interrogation of ‘the 
cold war’ as a discrete concept and singular period forces a closer look at the American nature of the 
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as the dominant parlance, the term also marks a passing of the torch from one imperial 
worldview to the next. Khalil concludes that this transition shared a common feature and 
symbolism in the context of great power rivalry: “the country that controlled the Middle 
East, in effect controlled the crossroads of the world” (344).  
 
The link between twentieth century UK and U.S.-Middle East relations and the region’s 
contemporary condition remains a subject deserving of greater scholarly attention. 
Khalil’s article is among the most recent contributions to a growing body of work on the 
Middle East in international history, underscoring the value of empirically rich studies 
that bring together local sources with archives in Great Britain, the United States, and 
farther afield.9 In laying out an agenda for future research, specifically among diplomatic 
historians, Khalil’s article provides an important scholarly map of how the ‘Middle East’ 
first came to be defined as a region.10   
 
 
Seth Anziska is completing his Ph.D. in International and Global History at Columbia 
University. His research interests include U.S.-Middle East relations, Israeli and 
Palestinian history, and modern Jewish politics. His dissertation, Camp David’s Shadow: 
The United States, Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1977–1988, examines the 
emergence of the Camp David Accords and the consequences for Israel, the Palestinians, 
and the wider Middle East. 
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project. Anders Stephanson, “Cold War Degree Zero,” in Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell, eds., Uncertain Empire: 
American History and the Idea of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 19-50. 
9 See, for example, Paul Thomas Chamberlin, The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012) and Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). 
10 For a comparative example, see Michel Gobat, “The Invention of Latin America: A Transnational 
History of Anti-Imperialism, Democracy and Race,” The American Historical Review (2013) 118 (5): 1345-137. 
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